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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we introduce CrowdSource, a statistical 
natural language processing system designed to make rapid 
inferences about malware functionality based on printable 
character strings extracted from malware binaries.  
CrowdSource “learns” a mapping between low-level 
language and high-level software functionality by 
leveraging millions of web technical documents from 
StackExchange, a popular network of technical question 
and answer sites, using this mapping to infer malware 
capabilities.  This paper describes our approach and 
provides an evaluation of its accuracy and performance, 
demonstrating that it can detect at least 14 high-level 
malware capabilities in unpacked malware binaries with an 
average per-capability f-score of 0.86 and at a rate of tens 
of thousands of binaries per day on commodity hardware. 
Keywords 
Malicious applications, reverse engineering, computer 
security, application security, network security 
1. INTRODUCTION 
To understand the cyber threat landscape the thousands of 
new malware variants observed every month must be 
inspected.  Thus it would be useful to use automation to 
accelerate the reverse engineering process to scale human 
analysts’ efforts to large volumes of malware. 
While existing literature on automated malware analysis 
has proposed methods for identifying similarity 
relationships between malware artifacts [1]–[4], and 
methods for automatically classifying malware into known 
malware families [4], [5], far fewer methods have been 
proposed for rapidly generating “capability profiles” for 
malware binaries [6].  A key reason for this lack of work on 
capability detection for malware, we believe, is that 
abstraction from low-level malware features has mostly 
been thought of as a manual knowledge engineering 
problem. 
Indeed, the approach taken by currently deployed automatic 
malware analysis systems, to our knowledge, is almost 
entirely based on hand-coded rules defined on statically and 
dynamically obtained features such as API calls and 
protocol strings [7].  While such approaches can be 
powerful in the hands of experts, a limitation of these 
approaches is that while they perform automatic inference 
on malware, the knowledge engineering work they require 
is anything but automatic and is hard to scale to the 
thousands of possible technical symbols that predict 
malware functionality of interest. 
In this paper we propose a new and complementary 
approach to existing automated malware analysis 
techniques, presenting a statistical capability detection 
model learned from millions of programming-related 
documents drawn from the StackExchange network of 
technical question and answer websites.  Figure 1 gives 
intuition for the CrowdSource approach, showing how a 
post on the site StackOverflow.com containing the 
capability relevant keyword “screenshot” also contains 
terms (such as “FindWindow” and “PrintWindow”) that 
occur in malware and are indicative of “screenshot” 
functionality.  Our intuition is that the co-occurrence of 
high level language like “screenshot” with low-level API 
calls used to implement this functionality can be exploited 
to detect capabilities such as “screenshot grabbing” within 
malware.  To do this, we have developed a Bayesian 
network based statistical approach for mapping large 
vocabularies of terms extracted from StackExchange to the 
high level capabilities they indicate. 
Because we have evaluated our approach, called 
CrowdSource, on malware printable strings data, we note 
that our approach requires deobfuscated (or “unpacked”) 
representations of malware binaries if it is to succeed in 
achieving useful inferences.  For the purposes of this paper, 
we do not engage the related and important problem of 
malware deobfuscation.  
Informal overview of the CrowdSource approach 
The goal of CrowdSource is to detect high-level malware 
capabilities based on malware strings data.  Here we define 
capabilities to be high-level functionality of interest to a 
malware analyst or network defender.  Example capabilities 
are “implements keystroke logging,” “turns on webcam,” 
and “takes screenshots of user’s desktop.” 
We have chosen to use printable strings extracted from 
malware to detect malware capabilities because, when 
malware is not obfuscated or is de-obfuscated, many 
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 malware variants’ strings data contain the API symbols 
malware calls, the DLL files malware imports, registry 
keys malware touches, and protocol format strings malware 
uses to communicate with other hosts, and thus these data 
form a rich starting place for applying natural language 
processing methods to malware capability inference.  While 
we evaluate CrowdSource on strings data here, we believe 
our approach could also have applicability to other malware 
data, such as dynamic trace data. 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the CrowdSource approach 
to detecting capabilities in malware binaries.  As shown in 
Figure 2, to use CrowdSource to detect capabilities within 
malware, the user creates a capability configuration file 
defining what capabilities they are interested in, also 
creating a search query for each capability, thereby telling 
CrowdSource how to retrieve StackExchange documents 
relevant to that capability.  For example, to use 
CrowdSource to detect malware that takes screenshots, the 
user might use the query “screenshot implementation,” 
leading CrowdSource to retrieve documents about 
implementing screenshot functionality. 
As further illustrated by Figure 2, CrowdSource uses the 
documents that are returned by each capability search query 
to find terms that are probabilistic indicators for the 
capability.  When CrowdSource observes these terms in 
malware samples strings data the system is able to compute 
a probability that the malware sample has a given 
capability. 
By enabling this workflow for any number of capabilities, 
CrowdSource provides capability “profiles” for malware 
binaries.  Furthermore, because our capability inference is a 
very fast process, taking about 200 milliseconds per sample 
on average, CrowdSource can perform this analysis on 
hundreds of binaries per minute depending on the user’s 
hardware configuration. 
Below we describe CrowdSource’s system components, 
and then give a detailed description of the workflow by 
which we initialize CrowdSource and detect capabilities 
within malware.  
2. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
In this section we describe CrowdSource’s four 
components and their interoperation.  First we give succinct 
definitions of each component: 
1) The full-text document index: the component we use to 
store the programming question and answer documents 
from StackExchange. 
2) The capability configuration: A configuration file 
where the user defines what capabilities he or she is 
interested in identifying within malware and gives search 
queries for these capabilities.  These search queries are 
used to identify documents within which we identify terms 
that are probabilistically indicative of capabilities.  
3) The term-capability conditional probability matrix: 
A matrix which holds automatically identified probabilistic 
associations between terms and capabilities that are used to 
compute the probabilities that a malware sample has a 
given set of capabilities. 
4) The malware capability inference module: a module 
that extracts terms from malware strings data and leverages 
the term-capability conditional probability matrix to infer 
the probability that a malware binary has each of the 
capabilities defined in the capability configuration. 
Figure 1.  An illustration of the intuition that we can correlate terms found in malware binaries and terms found in 
StackExchange documents to identify high-level software capabilities within malware 
 Below we describe these components and their 
interoperation in detail. 
The full text document index 
We use the full text document index to index a corpus of 
StackExchange programming question and answer 
documents that we use as a knowledge base for 
CrowdSource.  Each question in the StackExchange corpus 
constitutes a discussion thread, where a question includes a 
question title (typically a sentence length version of the 
technical question), a variable number of question tags 
(user defined tags that associate the question with technical 
topics like “opengl”) a question document (the question 
written in longer form) and some variable number of 
answer documents. 
We index these documents in the full text document index.  
All documents on the StackExchange sites, including both 
the single question document that heads each question 
thread, and each of the variable number of answer 
documents attached to each thread, are indexed as 
individual documents with a title, tags and body field. We 
store all of this text in markdown format [8] such that 
HTML metadata is stripped and all that remains is the 
literal text of each field. 
The capability configuration 
The capability configuration is the way that the 
CrowdSource user specifies the capabilities they want 
CrowdSource to detect and seeds CrowdSource with search 
queries that retrieve documents relevant to these 
capabilities.  CrowdSource then uses these documents to 
find probabilistic indicators of these capabilities. 
These search queries are defined as Boolean conditions on 
the documents’ terms.  Thus to find documents related to 
“remote desktop protocol” access to a host, we might 
define a query such as “'title:rdp AND tags:rdp,” which 
matches documents that have the term “rdp” in both their 
title and tags. 
The term-capability conditional probability matrix 
CrowdSource computes the probability that malware 
binaries have capabilities based on probabilistic indicator 
terms found in the malware strings.  The term-capability 
conditional probability matrix stores these indicators and 
their conditional probabilities, which give the probability 
that a capability is present if the indicator term is present. 
To make the concept of a probabilistic indicator term 
concrete consider the case of the “communicates via 
Internet Relay Chat” (IRC) capability.  The term 
“PRIVMSG” is highly indicative of IRC capability because 
“PRIVMSG,” an IRC protocol directive, almost always 
occurs in documents about IRC and almost never occurs 
elsewhere. CrowdSource thus assumes that when malware 
has the term PRIVMSG, it has a high probability of 
implementing IRC communications. 
The term-capability conditional probability matrix stores 
such probability values for every term in the capability 
search query result sets.  The matrix contains three 
columns: a term column, a conditional probability column, 
and a capability name column.  For each term !! found in 
the documents matching a search query for a capability !!, 
the conditional probability that the capability is present 
given the term is computed by the following formula: 
(1)  ∀!! ∈ !!; !! !! !! = ! !!! + !!!!! + !! + !!  
Here !!! is the set of occurrences of a given term within 
posts describing the target capability, !!! is the set of 
occurrences of the term in the full-text document index 
overall, and ! and ! are hyperparameters that allow us to 
adjust our prior belief that any given term in a result set 
should either indicate a given capability or not indicate the 
capability. 
Figure 2.  An overview of the CrowdSource workflow. 
 We note that (1) constitutes a Beta-Bernoulli model for 
estimating the Bernoulli parameter [9].  α and β are the 
parameters of the Beta, and can be modified to incorporate 
prior beliefs about the degree to which a given word 
indicates a given capability.  For our purposes we use the ! 
and ! hyperparameters to model our prior belief that words 
observed at least once in the query documents indicate the 
capability the query documents describe. 
For example, for any word in the query matching 
documents, we can set ! and ! to 10 and 90 respectively, 
giving a 10% prior probability for ! !! !!  for words that 
have been observed at least once in the context of a 
discussion of the capability, which will be balanced with 
the empirical observations modeled by !!! !and !!!.  For the 
purposes of this paper, we set ! and ! globally, to 10 and 
90 respectively as we have found these parameters give us 
the best results. 
While understanding why exactly this is the case will 
require additional investigation, our initial hypothesis is 
that it is because it makes up for both precision and recall 
bias in our document retrieval approach.  If it is true that 
our document retrieval approach generally retrieves some 
documents that are not about the capability while also 
missing some documents that are about the capability, then 
global priors such as those we have used here may possibly 
help adjust for this bias. 
The malware capability inference module 
The goal of the malware capability inference module is to 
compute the final probability that malware binaries have 
capabilities of interest.  As mentioned above, to compute 
these final probabilities we use a Bayesian network 
approach for combining independent indicator term 
conditional probabilities into a final probability.  Bayesian 
networks allow us to reason in a principled manner about 
the following question: given a set of probabilistic indicator 
terms extracted from a malware binary (say “privmsg”, 
“topic”, and “channel” for IRC), what is the final 
probability that the malware binary does indeed have this 
capability?  
In detail, this approach works as follows.  To extract terms 
from malware, we identify all printable substrings of the 
binary file greater than length four and then tokenize these 
strings along non-alphanumeric boundaries.  The resulting 
tokens are the malware’s terms. Having extracted a set of 
terms from the malware binary (which can be natural 
language words, API call names, etc.), we then lowercase 
normalize the terms.  For each capability !! in the 
capability configuration and for each of the malware terms 
T it is associated with, we compute a final probability the 
capability is present !(!!), as follows: 
(2) ! !!|!! … !! = !1 − ! (1 − ! !! !! )!  
In the Bayesian network formalism, (2) defines a “noisy-
OR” gate between the observed words in the malware and 
the probability that the malware contains a given capability.  
Noisy-OR gates such as (2) model the Boolean “OR” 
operation in a probabilistic context, asking the question, 
what is the probability that at least one of some 
enumeration of independent, probabilistically defined 
Boolean conditions is in fact true [10]. 
To make this idea concrete, consider a hypothetical case in 
which a malware binary has the terms “privmsg”, “topic”, 
and “channel” and we seek to compute the probability that 
the binary has the capability “IRC.”  Assuming 
P(IRC|privmsg) = 0.9, P(IRC|topic) = 0.5, and 
P(IRC|channel)=0.1, (2) would evaluate to 0.955.  In other 
words, (2) dictates that a malware capability is at least as 
probable to be present as the most indicative term, and 
grows in probability with each additional probabilistic 
indicator term. 
Once the malware capability inference module has 
computed probabilities for each capability in the capability 
configuration CrowdSource can optionally discretize these 
probabilities into binary capability detections (“yes” or 
“no” determinations that the binary does or does not have 
given capabilities) using a decision threshold.  
Alternatively, we can inform the user of the computed 
probabilities.  For the purposes of evaluation we make a 
binary decision to produce binary capability detections, as 
we detail in the next section. 
3. EVALUATION 
In the experiments described in this paper we initialized 
CrowdSource on a document corpus acquired from the 
Fig. 4. Precision and recall in relation to threshold 
Fig. 3. Document training datasets used in our evaluation. 
 StackExchange network of technical question and answer 
websites.  The StackExchange organization releases its 
question and answer documents under the Creative 
Commons license and in an easily parseable XML format.  
The table in Figure 3 describes the contents of each 
document corpus, illustrating that we trained our model on 
over 16 million documents. 
To evaluate CrowdSource, we hand-reverse engineered 
1457 malware binaries and labeled each as implementing 
any of 14 capabilities.  We obtained these malware binaries 
from two sources: first, from the MD:Pro malware feed 
from Frame4 [11], and second, from a team at MIT Lincoln 
Laboratories which provided the binaries to us for testing 
of the automated malware analysis prototypes we are 
developing in our lab.  
For each of these malware binaries, we verified that the 
binary was not “packed” (transformed by a binary 
obfuscator).  After verifying that the malware was 
unpacked, we manually inspected each binary to determine 
which capabilities it implements.  We chose not to label 
any malware binaries as not implementing a given 
capability, because verifying that a program does not do a 
given behavior is an often intractable and error prone 
endeavor.  Instead, to provide “negative” test examples for 
our evaluation, we assembled a set of 377 benign Windows 
XP binaries included with the Windows operating system.  
For each of our 14 capabilities, we created a “negative” test 
set composed of a subset of these 377 benign binaries that 
we verified, by inspecting the Windows XP documentation, 
do not implement the capability of interest.  
After creating our ground truth evaluation dataset, we 
created a capability configuration containing these 14 
capabilities and their corresponding search queries over our 
full-text document index.  The process by which we created 
the search queries in this configuration was one of trial and 
error, by which we attempted to formulate queries that 
maximized the number of relevant documents that were 
returned by the queries and minimized the number of 
irrelevant documents returned by the queries. We found 
that finding good queries is a time-consuming process: the 
optimization of CrowdSource’s full-text document index to 
allow users to quickly and easily identify the documents 
that describe the capability they are interested in would 
thus be important future work. 
The metrics we use to evaluate CrowdSource’s accuracy 
once we have decided on a capability configuration are a 
normalized variant of precision, and recall.  These metrics 
are based on the concepts of false and true positives and 
false and true negatives.  In our case, a false positive is a 
case where CrowdSource claims that a binary has a 
capability when in fact it does not, a false negative is a case 
where CrowdSource claims a binary does not have a 
capability where it really does, a true positive is where 
CrowdSource correctly detects a capability and a true 
negative is a case where CrowdSource did not detect a 
capability which it should not have.  
Precision is defined as follows: 
 
(2)  ! |!"#$!!"#$%$&'#||!"#$!!"#$%$&'#| !+ ! |!"#$%!!"#$%$&'#|! 
 
Whereas recall is defined as follows: 
 
(3)  ! |!"#$!!"#$%$&'#||!"#$!!"#$%$&'#| !+ ! |!"#$%! "#$%&'"(|! 
As such, precision is sensitive to the distribution of positive 
and negative examples in one’s test data.  In our case, 
because we have varying distributions of positive and 
negative test examples for malware capabilities, we modify 
precision so that we can it to be invariant to the underlying 
ratio of positive to negative examples for each capability.  
We normalize it so that they each represent precision and 
recall over an invariant ratio between true and false test 
examples, using the following equations:  
 
0"0.2"0.4"
0.6"0.8"1"
Accuracy'at'Decision'Threshold'of'0.37'
normalized"precision"recall"
Fig. 5. CrowdSource accuracy against a test corpus of labeled malware at threshold 0.37 
 True positive rate (TPR): 
 
(4)  ! |!"#$!!"#$%$&'#||!"#$!!"#$%$&'#| !+ ! |!"#$%! "#$%&'"(|! 
 
False Positive Rate (FPR): 
 
(5)  ! |!"#$%!!"#$%$&'#||!"#$%!!"#$%$&'#| !+ ! |!"#$! "#$%&'"(|! 
 
Normalized Precision: 
 
(6)  ! TP! ∗ !TPR!TP! ∗ !TPR! + !(1!– !TP) !∗ !FPR! 
For the purposes of this paper we set “true percentage” 
(TP) to 0.5, meaning that a given malware binary has a 
50% chance of either having or not having the capability in 
question.  Whether or not this is a realistic distribution will 
depend on the context in which CrowdSource is used; we 
chose this number because it is neutral with respect to the 
ratio between positive and negative binaries. 
Figure 4 displays CrowdSource’s normalized precision and 
recall as we vary a decision threshold from 0 to 1.  Two 
potentially optimal points can be identified in the figure: 
the area around 0.25 and 0.37.  At 0.25, the precision and 
recall lines cross at around 0.8, meaning that 20% of 
CrowdSource’s capability detections are false positives, 
and 20% are false negatives, over all 14 capabilities which 
we evaluate here.  At 0.37, CrowdSource’s error is reduced 
in precision (false positives) and increased in recall (false 
negatives, or missed detections).  Depending on use case, 
an operator may want to pick any number of decision 
thresholds.  Figure 5 displays a breakout of CrowdSource’s 
per-capability accuracy at a threshold of 0.37. 
The CrowdSource model is efficient to initialize for new 
capabilities, and also performs fast inference of capabilities 
when run on malware binaries.  To test the 14 capabilities 
evaluated here, CrowdSource required 119 seconds, on 
average (with a standard deviation of 91 seconds), to learn 
each capability, on a single core 2Ghz x86 processor with 
32GB of RAM. In terms of computational complexity, this 
process is O(n), with n as the number of unique words in 
the documents matching the capability query.  
Figure 6 gives empirical runtimes for CrowdSource when 
performing inference on malware, illustrating that 
CrowdSource performs efficient inference on malware and 
is a suitable tool for analyzing tens of thousands of binaries 
per day.  As is clear from the figure, the most common 
runtime for malware binary capability inference is 
approximately 200 milliseconds, with an observed upper 
bound of 7 seconds and lower bound in the 100-millisecond 
bin.  The system infers malware capabilities in linear time 
with respect to the number of terms extracted from each 
malware binary as can be seen in (2). 
Qualitative aspects of our approach 
A property of our system that is more difficult to measure 
empirically is the traceability it provides for its detection 
decisions, which we believe may help analysts reverse 
engineer malware more quickly and effectively.  Indeed, by 
allowing analysts to see why CrowdSource has flagged a 
binary as having some likelihood of having some 
capability, we believe we can give them more insight into 
whether or not a binary has a capability, and, if the binary 
does have the capability, how it is implemented. 
Figure 7 shows command line output from our research 
prototype.  Our goal in designing the output of the 
command line tool was, for each symbol associated with 
each capability detected within a malware binary, to give 
evidence for why that symbol gives evidence that the 
capability detection is correct.  In other words, we 
attempted to “auto-document” CrowdSource’s output for 
the user, so as to give more experienced users justification 
for the tool’s decisions and less experienced users both 
justification and background information which they may 
use to learn the meaning of technical symbols they haven’t 
encountered before. 
As shown in the Figure, we do this in two ways.  First, we 
give an example post title that is “about” the capability of 
interest and also contains the symbol found in the malware.  
Second, we also give an example post title and we also give 
a text snippet from within that post to highlight where the 
symbol found in the malware occurs in the post.  
4. RELATED WORK 
A significant body of work within both academic research 
and the open source security software community overlaps 
with what we have proposed in this paper.  The closest 
effort to CrowdSource is described in [6].  This work came 
out of our lab and preceded the effort described in the 
present paper. [6] was an early effort to use web technical 
Fig. 6. Histogram giving runtimes for capability inference 
on 839 test binaries. 
Seconds 
 documents to gain insight into malware symbols, and 
describes a method for using symbol co-occurrence 
patterns in web question and answer posts to group 
semantically related symbols extracted from a malware 
binary into clusters. 
Additionally, [6] describes a method for associating 
StackOverflow folksonomy tags with the binaries so as to 
make unsupervised malware capability detections.  What is 
different about the work described in this paper is that the 
approach described here is semi-supervised; instead of 
attempting to gain insight into malware binaries based on 
the tags they are associated with on StackOverflow, we 
allow users to define queries into a large corpus of question 
and answer site postings so as to define the capabilities they 
are looking for.  The result is a more accurate system with a 
less noisy system output format that allows users to define 
in advance the capabilities they would like to detect within 
malware. 
Another related effort is an open source project, RE-
Google, a plugin for the popular commercial reverse 
engineering framework IDAPro [12]. RE-Google 
accelerates the reverse engineering process by mapping 
between textual strings found in malware and open source 
source code stored on Google Code.   Similar to RE-
Google is RE-Source, which maps between features in 
malware binary code and a large array of Internet source 
code search engine APIs [13].  The difference between 
CrowdSource and RE-Google and RE-Source is that while 
RE-Google and RE-Source identify code deemed to be 
similar to disassembled malware code, CrowdSource 
produces binary capability classifications, predicting 
whether or not discrete capabilities exist in the malware.  
And whereas RE-Google and RE-Source are based on 
textual source code, CrowdSource trains on question and 
answer documents. 
The Yara framework [7], as discussed above, relates to 
CrowdSource in that it provides a simple domain specific 
language which can be used to identify malware 
capabilities.  Similarly, [3] describes a system that uses 
expert rules in the capability identification module in order 
to classify malware binaries based on what traits they have 
where traits are abilities like accessing the webcam or 
taking screenshots.  Of course, unlike Yara and the work 
described in Saxe et al., CrowdSource does not rely on 
expert rules to detect malware capabilities. 
In the domain of machine learning, Yavvari et al. present a 
system that identifies the behavioral components of 
malware done by clustering extracted features from a 
dynamic execution run in a sandbox [1].  While identifying 
behavioral components is related to the problem of 
detecting malware capabilities, Yavvari’s components are 
unlabeled and thus give no information as to the 
functionality they actually produce. 
CrowdSource is based on applying natural language 
processing techniques to the software engineering domain 
and in this area it is not alone.  Mokhov et al. applied NLP 
and machine learning (ML) techniques to static code 
analysis to discover software vulnerabilities in benign 
programs by comparing a database of vulnerabilities 
against the programs source code.  NLP techniques have 
also been applied to source code analysis by Kuhn et al. 
[14], although their purpose was to cluster software that 
had similar purposes. 
Applying natural language processing techniques to 
question and answer websites like StackOverflow is a 
recent trend in the research literature. The research 
presented by [15] explores the community aspect of these 
websites in order to determine how valuable answers are. 
This is important to CrowdSource as there is the possibility 
of data misleading the outcome of our capability 
definitions. The research draws the conclusion that not all 
questions may be sufficiently answered but also concludes 
that StackOverflow has little problem with user 
misbehavior due to their reputation system which allows 
users of the system to assign low reputation scores to 
postings of low utility. 
Some research has attempted to draw on human analysis in 
order to gain insight into malware capabilities. A 
crowdsourcing toolkit was developed by [16] for the 
purpose of threat detection during web browsing. The 
toolkit is a system based on machine learning and natural 
language processing that incorporates user input in order to 
categorize websites based on their detected level of 
maliciousness.  Unlike our system, which relies on a corpus 
of documents to learn malware capability detection models, 
their system depends on user participation to detect 
malicious websites.    
CrowdSource implements Bayesian based probabilistic 
methods for NLP and there have been multiple security 
detection research efforts that employ similar approaches.  
The most relevant case is the work of Villamarin et al. [17] 
Figure 7. Terminal output from the CrowdSource 
prototype displaying a capability detection on a 
“KBot” IRC bot sample in our test corpus.  Here the 
tool has been set to a high “verbosity” level, showing 
which posts contained the symbol identified in the 
malware but also where in those postings the symbols 
occurred.  
 where a method for botnet detection was introduced. They 
derive their model from previous works on email analysis 
relating to spam detection where certain words and their 
frequencies predict spam. Their work looks at DNS traffic 
as features in detecting botnet clusters using a Bayesian 
network similar to CrowdSource. We look at symbolic 
information to detect capabilities whereas [17] looks at 
DNS traffic to detect botnet activity. 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have proposed and evaluated a statistical 
capability detection model estimated with a corpus of 
millions of web technical question and answer documents.  
We have shown that we are able to automatically perform 
capability inference by matching symbols extracted from 
malware binaries to the symbols that constitute the model.   
CrowdSource is currently actively used in our own lab and 
in use at two government agencies, giving evidence that the 
approach has real merit for its ability to help today’s 
malware analysts automate a portion of their reverse 
engineering workflow.  The tool is also available on our 
company website [18], licensed as freeware. 
Given the early success of our natural language processing 
approach against malware strings data, we believe a fruitful 
line of investigation would involve applying similar 
techniques to malware dynamic trace data.  Additionally, 
our approach might be extended to more in-depth static 
analysis approaches, including C++ symbol demangling 
and analyzing string references in the context of control 
flow analysis so as to infer where malware implements 
detected functionality, for example. 
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